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Introduction 
The Investigatory Powers Act (IPA) was a response to concerns about surveillance in the light 
of a series of cases from both European courts1 which found the challenged regimes to be 
inadequately specified in law and disproportionate.  The IPA is not, however, a complete 
regime for all types of surveillance and intelligence gathering.  This article considers another 
such area, the use of Automated Number Plate Recognition (ANPR), which raises the difficult 
issue of privacy in public places and which in the main lies outside the IPA.  Relying on 
jurisprudence on the right to a private life from the European courts, this article puts forward 
the argument that ANPR and the retention of ANPR data constitutes an interference with an 
individual’s right to privacy.  As well as the concerns arising from systemic retention of data 
and inadequate handling arrangements, this article addresses the question of whether ANPR 
constitutes an intrusion into locational privacy, a subset of privacy that has not been directly 
discussed yet in domestic legal literature. Any intrusion into privacy must be justified: that is, 
it must be for a legitimate purpose, in accordance with the law, and proportionate.  It is argued 
that the current regime regarding ANPR is deficient in a number of respects when measured 
against these requirements, and that the domestic courts’ approach to privacy is likewise 
insufficient.  The ANPR regime also illustrates the problematic, minimalist response of the UK 
to European rulings on privacy generally and state surveillance specifically.2  In failing to 
respect the underlying principles, any regime runs the risk of being challenged and the article 
concludes by recognising that risk in this context.  With increased deployment of ANPR, this 
issue is one of significance for road users and law enforcement alike. As other surveillance 
technologies which contribute to the erosion of privacy in public spaces, notably drones (UAV) 
and body worn video (BWV), become increasingly used, the questions raised here have more 
general significance.   
Automated Number Plate Recognition and the Current Domestic Regulatory Framework 
ANPR, whether mounted in cars or in fixed locations, is a form of CCTV used to read and store 
vehicle number plates.  The police ANPR system in England stores two images in respect of 
each ‘read’: one is of the number plate; the second, an image of the whole vehicle. The time 
and location of the read is also recorded. The data are processed locally by police forces before 
being transferred to the National ANPR Data Centre (NADC). The data is then available to the 
police for searching nationally.  The Metropolitan Police (the Met) has a separate system, 
which was introduced to tackle terrorist threats connected to the London Olympics.  Data in 
                                                          
1 See e.g. Case C-362/14 Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner, judgment 6 October 2015 (Grand Chamber) 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:627 and 650; Joined Cases C-203/15 and C-698/15 Tele2/Watson, judgment  21 December 
2016 (Grand Chamber) ECLI:EU:C:2016:572 and 970; Roman Zakharov v. Russia (App. no 47143/06), judgment 
4 December 2015 (Grand Chamber); Szabó and Vissy v. Hungary (App. nos 11327/14 and 11613/14), judgment 
12 January 2016. 
2 See e.g Emmerson et al Human Rights and Criminal Justice (2nd ed) (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2007), para 
7.13-14; S., McKay, Covert Policing: Law and Practice (2nd ed) (Oxford: OUP, 2015) para 1.16. 
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NADC is stored for all vehicles, including data for vehicles that are not known to be of interest 
at the time of the read, if ever. The amount of data stored is vast: the NPCC ANPR Strategy 
suggests a figure of 40 million reads daily.  While the ANPR web-page states that ANPR data 
is held for two years,3 The Commissioner for Surveillance Cameras (CSC) noted that there 
were plans to extend the period of data retention from two years to a maximum of seven.  
Further, according to ANPR User Group minutes, the Met has retained data for longer than two 
years.4   
The ANPR system can cross check ANPR data with lists of driver information.  These lists 
include, for example, details of those without valid insurance or of suspects in ongoing 
investigations.  In addition to immediate cross-checking for problem cases, the data may be 
retained for future use in criminal investigations generally.   The CSC’s Report for 2014/15 
noted that the NADC data can be used for data mining in a number of ways: real time and 
retrospective vehicle tracking; identifying all vehicles that have taken a particular route during 
a particular time frame (vehicle matching); identifying all vehicles present in a particular place 
at a particular time (geographical matching); verifying alibis, locating offenders or identifying 
potential witnesses; linking individuals to identify vehicles travelling in convoy (network 
analysis); and subject analysis when ANPR data is integrated with other sources of data 
(CCTV, communications analysis, financial analysis) to create an in-depth profile of an 
individual.  These different types of analysis mean that the data generated by ANPR may be 
used predictively and generally. In this, we see a shift from specific and suspicion-based 
collection and use of data to a less discriminate system which poses greater risks for individual 
privacy.5 
While there is no specific statutory mention of ANPR, certain legislation is relevant to its 
operation: the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA), the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA) 
and possibly the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) and IPA.  The use of 
ANPR falls within the DPA as the registration number and the wider vehicle image could 
constitute ‘personal data’. 6   Data protection principles therefore apply.  The Information 
Commissioner issued a Code of Practice7 with regard to CCTV, including ANPR cameras, 
elaborating the data protection rules in this context.  It does not, however, provide a legal basis 
for the collection of data.  PoFA (which applies only to England and Wales) established the 
CSC, who likewise developed a code8  on the appropriate use of surveillance cameras by 
relevant authorities, including the police.9  The obligation on relevant authorities is to have 
regard to the code; non-compliance is not in itself a civil wrong or criminal offence.10  The 
                                                          
3 See also ACPO, The Police use of Automatic Number Plate Recognition:  A review by a working group of 
interested parties aimed at addressing concerns and providing understanding of the workings and regulation of 
the system, January 2013, available at: 
http://www.npcc.police.uk/Publication/ANPR/The%20police%20use%20of%20ANPR%20FinalJan2013.pdf, 
accessed 24th January 2017 
4 ANPR National User Group, Minutes, 3rd June 2015, available at: 
https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/289438/response/730763/attach/html/6/03%20ANPR%20NUG%
20Minutes%2003062015.pdf.html, accessed 24th January 2017 
5 See e.g. European Data Protection Supervisor, Towards a New Digital Ethics: Data, dignity and technology, 
Opinion 4/2015, 11 September 2015, p 6, pp. 12-13 
6 S. 1 DPA 
7 ICO, In the picture: A data protection code of practice for surveillance cameras and personal information, 21 
May 2015,  available at: https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1542/cctv-code-of-
practice.pdf, accessed 24th January 2017 
8 Home Office, Surveillance Camera Code of Practice, June 2013. 
9 Section 29 POFA; Home Office, Circular 011/2013: surveillance camera code of practice, 12 August 2013 
10 Section 33 PoFA 
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code reflects at a very general level some of the concerns protected by Article 8 ECHR/ Article 
7 EUCFR. The two codes have principles in common, as the Information Comissioner’s code 
makes clear, though each has separate ‘enforcement’ processes.  In particular, the role of the 
CSC is not enforcement of the code but rather to encourage compliance.11 
Covert surveillance falls outside DPA and PoFA, being dealt with by RIPA.  Part II of RIPA, 
which provides some basis for investigatory techniques which previously had none, applies to 
the use of covert directed or intrusive surveillance by designated public authorities12 (as well 
as to covert human intelligence sources (CHIS)13).  Authorization for directed surveillance and 
CHIS is given by a police superintendent14 and for intrusive surveillance the approval of a 
senior authorising officer is required.  A failure to obtain authorization seems, however, to have 
no legal consequences.15  Note that electronic tracking devices are expressly excluded from the 
intrusive surveillance regime and other forms of surveillance – such as CCTV – do not fit easily 
in the framework.16 
The IPA does not regulate the creation of ANPR datasets or their analysis by the police. Part 
VII IPA provides some control over the use by intelligence agencies of “bulk personal 
datasets”.  “Bulk personal datasets” are defined in s. 199 IPA as a set of information that 
includes personal data relating to a number of individuals where the majority of those 
individuals are not and are not likely to be of interest to the intelligence services and where an 
intelligence service retains the set, which is held electronically for analysis.  ANPR data could 
fall within this definition. Therefore, an intelligence agency seeking to analyse ANPR data 
would require a warrant so to do.  Whether the provisions themselves are acceptable from a 
privacy perspective is one question,17 and one which falls outside the scope of this article.  
What is clear is that the IPA does not regulate the police use of ANPR.  
Finally, it should be noted that some police powers to investigate are based in the common 
law.18  In the case of Wood, 19 which involved the photography by the police of Wood, the 
Court approved older jurisprudence 20  which described police powers broadly as all steps 
necessary for preventing crime. Insofar as this is accepted, the common law basis, which is 
open-ended, could be used also in relation to ANPR. 
Human Rights Standards 
Answering the question of whether the ANPR regime is open to challenge requires the 
identification of standards against which that regime should be measured.  In this context, the 
two European systems, the Council of Europe and the European Union, and their respective 
                                                          
11 Section 34 PoFA 
12 Emmerson n. 2, para 7-47. 
13 S. 26(7) RIPA. 
14 S. 28 RIPA; see Emmerson, n. 2, paras 7-49- 7-53. 
15 C v. Police and Secretary of State IPT/03/32/H, para 42; C.f. Tugendhat J. in AJK v Commr of Police of the 
Metropolis [2013] 1 WLR 2734 . 
16 C Walker Terrorism and the Law (Oxford: OUP, 2011), para 2.70. 
17 See Privacy International v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and Ors [2016] 
UKIPTrib 15_110_CH. Bulk personal datasets are among the provisions being challenged by Liberty in a judicial 
review action launched 28 February 2017. 
18 O’Floinn and Omerod suggest that the common law could be used in respect of police activity which does 
not clearly fit into the existing statutory framework in the context of social media surveillance: ‘Social 
Networking Sites, RIPA and Criminal Investigations’ (2011) 10 Crim LR 766, p. 775. 
19 Wood [2008] EWHC 1105 (Admin). 
20 Rice v Connolly [1966] 2 QB 414. 
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human rights documents – the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the 
European Charter of Fundamental Rights (the Charter) – appear relevant, but are both 
applicable to the situation at hand? 
The Human Rights Act (HRA) implements the ECHR. It requires public authorities, for 
example the police, to act compatibly with a number of rights in the ECHR, including Article 
8. When considering a question concerning the ECHR, national courts must have regard to the 
case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).  While the ECtHR’s jurisprudence 
is not binding on the English courts,21 it will normally be followed22 and, where a discrepancy 
in approach arises, an individual may still bring a claim before the ECtHR. 
The Charter applies only within the scope of EU law23 but the boundaries of EU law are not 
precisely delineated.  While the protection of rights forms part of the basis of the EU, it cannot 
create the grounds for its own application.24  Article 16 TFEU (and Article 39 TEU as regards 
common foreign and security policies) gives the EU power to take action in respect to the right 
to data protection (but not the right to private life).  Are these provisions sufficient to bring all 
data protection activities within the scope of EU law? Notably, the UK takes the position that, 
in relation to shared competence, if the Union has not acted then the specific issue does not fall 
within the scope of EU law.25  The position on this point is not yet clear,26 though the Court of 
Justice is unlikely to view the matter so narrowly. 27   Furthermore, there are a number of EU 
instruments which particularise the right: the Data Protection Directive,28 shortly to be replaced 
by the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR);29 and Law Enforcement Data Protection 
Directive,30 replacing Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA.   
The position remains more complex than suggesting that this legislative activity results in all 
data processing activity falling within the scope of EU law.31  It could be argued that, because 
the Framework Decision is in place,32 the question of whether police activities fall within EU 
                                                          
21 E.g. R (Ullah) v Special Adjudicator [2004] UKHL 26, para 20 
22 R. v Horncastle [2009] UKSC 14 
23 The Charter specifies refers to implementing EU law but the Court in Case C-617/10 Åkerberg Fransson, 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:105, returned to the phraseology adopted in pre-Lisbon case law. 
24 Article 6 TEU; Article 51(2) Charter 
25 Supported by Protocol 25 on the Exercise of Shared Competence 
26 The Court of Justice seems to have taken a very broad approach in Fransson, n. 23, but a much narrower one 
in Case C-446-9/12 Willems ECLI:EU:C:2015:238. Willems has been criticised: S Peers, ‘Biometric Data and Data 
Protection Law: the CJEU Loses the Plot’ (2015) August/September Computers and Law 
27 Safjan, M., ‘Fields of application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and constitutional dialogues in the 
European Union’ EUI Distinguished Lectures 2014/02 (CJC DL 2014/02), 9 May 2014, available: 
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/32372/CJC_DL_2014_02.pdf?sequence=3, accessed 2 February 
2017, p. 5.   
28 Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on 
the free movement of such data [1995] OJ L 281/31. 
29 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 General Data Protection Regulation [2016] OJ L119/1 
30 Directive (EU) 2016/680 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the Processing of Personal Data 
by Competent Authorities for the Purposes of the Prevention, Investigation, Detection or Prosecution of 
Criminal Offences or the Execution of Criminal Penalties, and on the Free Movement of Such Data [2016] OJ L 
119/89. 
31 Case C-442/00 Caballero v Fondo de Garantia Salarial (Fogasa) [2002] ECR I-11915, paras 29 – 30 
32 Implemented in the UK: Ministry of Justice, Council Framework Decision on the protection of personal data 
processed in the framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters 2008/799/JHA, Circular 
2011/01, 25th January 2011 
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law depend on that instrument’s scope.  The Framework Decision relates only to cross border 
data flows, however.  The new Law Enforcement Directive covers police processing generally 
but will come into force in 2018.33  This current gap may be more apparent than real because 
of the existence of the general data protection regime.  Although there are exceptions for law 
enforcement in the Data Protection Directive,34 a Member State’s act of derogation still falls 
within the scope of EU law.35  On that basis, while there may be scope for derogating from the 
substantive processing rules, relevant authorities would still have to comply with the Charter 
in so doing. As regards the new Law Enforcement Directive, the position is complicated by the 
UK’s position under Title V of the TFEU: the UK is not bound by measures under Title V of 
TFEU unless it opts into them.36  As a result, public authorities ‘are not bound by the rules laid 
down’ in the Law Enforcement Directive in respect of measures into which the UK has not 
opted. 37  The UK government argued that the Law Enforcement Directive will not apply to 
internal situations in the UK.38 
It is far from clear that the Government’s position is correct.  First, the UK has opted in to some 
actions, for example those relating to terrorism, child pornography and people trafficking.39 
Insofar as data acquisition, retention and examination could be used in relation to those actions, 
the processes would have to comply with the Law Enforcement Directive and thus be within 
the scope of EU law.  Attempting to separate data collected and retained on a bulk scale 
according to its use would be practically impossible.  Secondly, the possibility to opt-in is 
provided by EU law and therefore, following NS, should fall within EU law.40  In NS,41 the 
exercise of a discretionary power by the Secretary of State in the context of the Dublin 
Regulation on asylum seekers was held to form part of the EU system of law. The commonality 
between discretion and derogation is that in both instances EU law provides the framework 
within which Member States’ choices are exercised.42  Finally, it makes little sense to suggest 
that an area that currently falls within the scope of EU law as derogation from the Data 
Protection Directive would subsequently fall outside EU law after the enactment of a directive 
                                                          
33 Article 3(7) Law Enforcement Directive, n. 30 
34 Article 13 Data Protection Directive, n. 28 
35 Case C-260/89 ERT v DEB [1991] ECR I-2925, which is mentioned explicitly in the Explanations regarding 
Article 51 Charter; K Lenaerts and JA Gutiérrez-Fons, ‘The Constitutional Allocation of Powers and General 
Principles of EU Law’ (2010) 47 Common Market Law Review 1629 
36  Article 6a of Protocol 21 to the EU Treaties on the position of the UK and Ireland in respect of the area of  
freedom, security, and justice annexed to the TFEU. 
37 Recital 99 Law Enforcement Directive, n. 29.  The UK chose to be bound by the Law Enforcement Directive: 
Kenneth Clarke, MP Personal Data Directive, Hansard, 19 June 2012, Column 57WS-58WS. 
38 Ministry of Justice, Call for Evidence on the Review of the Balance of Competences between the United 
Kingdom and the European Union: Information Rights (2014), available at: 
https://consult.justice.gov.uk/digital-communications/balance-of-competency-review-information-
rights/user_uploads/boc-information-rights-call-for-evidence.pdf-2, (accessed 2nd February 2017), para 45 
39 See list of measures here: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/405887/Opt-
in_webpage_update_-_data_-_Feb_2015.pdf, accessed 3 February 2017 
40 Accepted in e.g. R (on the application of Zagorski and Base) v Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and 
Skills [2010] EWHC 3110 (Admin), paras 69–70. 
41 Joined Cases C‑411/10 and C‑493/10 NS v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (C-411/10) and M. 
E. and Ors v. Refugee Applications Commissioner (C-493/10) (Grand Chamber), judgment 21 December 2011, 
ECLI:EU:C:2011:865. 
42 P Eeckhout, ‘The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Federal Question (2002) 39 Common Market 
Law Review 975, p. 978. 
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specifically on point.  It therefore seems likely that the activities of law enforcement do fall 
within the scope of EU law and must comply with the Charter (as well as the ECHR).43 
Following Brexit, it is unclear how much will change.  The UK, unless steps are taken to change 
the position here too, will still be part of the ECHR and will continue to have effect through 
the HRA. The Charter will not be directly relevant to the UK, but it may still have an indirect 
effect.  If the UK wants to maintain data flows with the EU an adequacy decision under the 
GDPR will effectively be required.  Achieving this has the effect of bringing the UK into a 
position where its laws may be assessed by reference to the Charter, as can be seen in 
Schrems.44  Schrems concerned the challenge to the adequacy decision made in respect of the 
United States.  In that case, the internal arrangements of the United States were assessed for 
their impact on privacy by reference to Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter and this included policy 
fields – such as national security – which normally fall outside the scope of EU competence.  
It may be that this indirect review of the UK is broader than that to which it is currently subject 
as a Member State.  
Privacy in Public Spaces 
The first consideration is whether privacy, and specifically Article 8 ECHR or Articles 7 and 
8 of the Charter, apply.  Article 8 ECHR is broad, comprising a number of elements: private 
life, family life; home; and correspondence. The Charter provides protection in similar terms 
in Article 7; Article 8 EUCFR provides a separate right to data protection. The ECtHR has 
interpreted ‘private life’ broadly.45  In general terms, the Charter will be interpreted in line with 
the ECHR.46  ‘Private life’ includes personal, social and economic relations; moral and physical 
integrity;47 personal identity;48 personal information;49 reputation;50 and personal or private 
space.51  As the ECtHR noted in Pretty, the notion of personal autonomy is central to its 
understanding of Article 8 ECHR52 and ‘[t]he very essence of the Convention is respect for 
human dignity and human freedom’.53  It is certainly not limited to confidentiality, secrecy or 
aloneness.  Nonetheless, Article 8 ECHR, and its Charter equivalents, cannot cover every 
aspect of our lives or every relationship that we might form.54  In the context of a claim that a 
ban on hunting was an interference with Article 8 ECHR, Baroness Hale in the Supreme Court, 
stated that the protection of psychological and physical space protected by the right fell ‘some 
way short of protecting everything they might want to do even in that private space; and it 
certainly does not protect things that they can only do by leaving it, and engaging in a very 
public gathering and activity’.55 This raises the question as whether individuals can rely on 
Article 8 ECHR (or Articles 7 and 8 EUCFR) in relation to public activities, such as driving 
down a road and what sorts of State activity constitute interference.  The position in this area 
                                                          
43 D. Anderson A Question of Trust (2015) accepted this point but without distinguishing between different 
activities, para 5.2 
44 Schrems, n. 1 
45 Pretty v. UK (App no. 2346/02), judgment 29 April 2002.  
46 C-400/10 PPU, J. McB. v L. E [2010] ECR I-8965; Article 52(3) Charter 
47 E.g. Bensaid v. UK (App no. 44599/98) [2001] ECHR 82 
48 E.g. Stübing v. Germany (App no. 43547/08), judgment 12 April 2012 
49 E.g. L.H. v Latvia (App. no 52019/07), judgment 29 April 2014 
50 Mikolajová v. Slovakia (App. no 4479/03), judgment 18 January 2011 
51 Peck v UK (App no. 44647/98), judgment 28 January 2003, [2003] ECHR 44; Wood v. Commissioner of Police 
for the Metropolis [2009] EWCA Civ 414 
52 Pretty, n. 45, para 61 
53 Pretty, n. 45, para 65 
54 Barbulescu v Romania (App. no. 61496/08), judgment 12 January 2016 
55 Countryside Alliance and others v Attorney General and another [2007] UKHL 52, para 116 
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is not entirely clear, and it is arguable that there is some difference in approach especially as 
regards the domestic courts.   
The starting point for the domestic courts and the ECtHR is similar56; that being observed in 
public does not trigger privacy.57 Equating the taking of a photograph to the act of observing 
with the naked eye, photography (in a public place) on its own is not contrary to English law,58 
though its subsequent dissemination might constitute misuse of private information.59  In Peck, 
the ECtHR distinguished between the monitoring of someone in a public place (via CCTV) 
and the recording of that image.60 It found that the further dissemination of the CCTV images 
to the media constituted an infringement of Article 8, but did not consider the question of 
whether the process of creating the images also constituted an intrusion because Peck did not 
argue this point.  While in practice there may be close connections between these stages, it is 
important to note that there are at least three of them: the viewing of an individual; the creation 
of a record (howsoever structured); and use of that information.  Dissemination could be a 
fourth state. It is an open question whether the creation of a temporary record as part of the 
observation process fits in stage one or two.  These different stages may affect privacy to 
different degrees. The ECtHR has also recognised the interests affected by unwanted 
photography. In Reklos, 61  reasoning from the fact that Article 8 protects an individual’s 
identity, it held that a person’s image revealed his or her unique characteristics and constituted 
one of the chief attributes of his or her personality.  Effective protection of the right to control 
one’s image required the consent of the person concerned when the picture was being taken 
and not just in relation to publication of that image.  The image in this case was taken in the 
hospital. It may not therefore translate exactly to photography/recording in public places.  
Although the ECtHR recognised this point about location, it is significant that the judgment 
was not based on spatial considerations, but on concerns for personality. 
Peck reminds us that Article 8 protections are not limited to private spaces. Numerous cases 
affirm that there is ‘a zone of interaction of a person with others, even in a public context, 
which may fall within the scope of “private life”’62.  While there is no automatic claim for 
privacy in a public space, especially for public persons,63  such a claim cannot be totally 
excluded either. In von Hannover Article 8 was held to be applicable. 64   The case concerned 
the applicant, a public person, engaged in activities such as shopping, horse-riding or meeting 
her boyfriend, activities which the Court held fell within her private life.  In finding that there 
had been an infringement, the ECtHR emphasised that the images of ‘intimate “information”’ 
were taken ‘in a climate of continual harassment’. 65  Although von Hannover concerned less 
                                                          
56 The Court of Justice has not ruled on this point. The case of Ryneš v Úřad pro ochranu osobních údajů (Case 
C-212/13), ECLI:EU:C:2014:2428, concerned CCTV overlooking a public space but focussed on the meaning of 
‘household exception’ in Article 3(2) Data Protection Directive.  Nonetheless, the Court of Justice  emphasised 
the importance of privacy, albeit as an interpretive principle of the Directive generally. 
57 Herbecq v Belgium (App no 32200/96 and 32201/96) Dec 14 Jan 1998, Decisions and Reports (1999) 92-9.   
58 Clayton, R., and Tomlinson, H., The Law of Human Rights (2nd ed) (OUP) para 12.142, c.f. more recently 
Weller v Associated Newspapers [2015] EWCA Civ 1176 para 61, discussed Clerk and Lindseel on Torts (21st ed) 
Main Volume, ‘Breach of Confidence and Privacy’, para 27-42. 
59 Campbell v. MGN [2004] UKHL 22 
60 Peck, n. 51, para 59 
61 Reklos v Greece (App no 1234/05) judgment 15 January 2009, para 40 
62 Von Hannover v. Germany (App no. 59320/00), judgment 24 June 2004, [2004] ECHR 294, para 50; Peck, n. 
51, para 57; PG and JH v. UK (App no. 44787/98), ECHR 2001 IX, para 56. 
63 Von Hannover (No 2) v Germany (2012) 55 EHRR 15, paras 109 to 113 
64 Von Hannover, n. 62, para 69 
65 Von Hannover, n. 62, paras 59 and 70. 
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clearly sensitive information than Peck and was more public than Reklos, it also involved an 
ongoing monitoring that of itself could be intrusive.  In sum, in each of these cases, there was 
some exacerbating factor beyond the taking of the photograph, though the factor was not the 
same in each case. 
Von Hannover also referred to the applicant’s ‘legitimate expectation of privacy’. This phrase, 
or its variant ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’, has become central to the jurisprudence on 
Article 8 ECHR and the English tort, misuse of private information, developed from 
Campbell.66 Following Campbell, the taking of a photograph is viewed as a use of private 
information in a particularly sensitive format. Many of the cases have involved intrusion by 
the media, rather than the State.  They therefore require the balancing of two rights: the right 
to private life and the right of the media to freedom of expression, but before this balancing 
takes place, the claimants must demonstrate that there is a ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ 
in the information.67 This is a fact sensitive analysis in which a range of factors are taken into 
account: the sensitivity of the information; the context in which the information was obtained; 
and whether the information was in the public domain.68 Significantly, in these media cases, 
the English courts have recently accepted that even innocuous public activities could give rise 
to a reasonable expectation of privacy.69 Note, however, that in these cases, photography of 
children who had not themselves courted publicity was involved. Without such exacerbating 
factors would the court have so found?70   
We must also question whether the approach in Von Hannover and Campbell, which applies in 
the relationship between non-state actors, is - or should be applied - in exactly the same way 
when the intrusion is committed by the State. In Kinloch, which concerned police observation 
of a suspect, the Supreme Court held that a person cannot have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in criminal acts, and such a person in public takes the risk that his actions will be 
noted.71  In the subsequent Re JR38,72 the Supreme Court was split as to whether Article 8 
ECHR was engaged.  The case concerned the publication of CCTV stills in the media to 
facilitate the identification of an individual who had been involved in rioting.  While most of 
their Lordships felt that the test of a reasonable expectation of privacy was the key, and that 
the criminal nature of a person’s activities was found to be relevant in limiting that expectation, 
Lord Kerr in the minority held that it was an important factor but not determinative.73 Arguably, 
the majority over-emphasised a particular conception of ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’, a 
conception which blurs factors for the applicability of the right to private life with 
considerations taken into account when justifying any interference.  Such an approach runs the 
risk of undermining the human rights protection of those suspected or convicted of an offence. 
Indeed, the ECtHR has ruled that the publication of images of those involved in criminal cases 
have violated Article 8.74  Moreover, the question of whether an assessment of the privacy 
right’s engagement should not be solely about whether there is a reasonable expectation of 
privacy. Rather, as suggested by Lord Kerr in JR38, this test although important factor is not 
                                                          
66 Campbell, n. 59, Lord Nicholls, paras 11-22 
67 McKennit v Ash [2008] QB 73 
68 Clayton and Tomlinson, n. 58, paras 12.27-12.40; for the position at the ECtHR see von Hannover (No 2), n. 
63. 
69 Murray v Big Pictures (UK) Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 446; Weller n. 58 
70 Campbell n. 59; Wood, n. 51, paras 32-36. 
71 Kinloch v HM Advocate [2013] 2 AC 93. 
72 In re JR38 [2015] UKSC 42. 
73 Re JR 38 n. 72, para 56. 
74 E.g. Sciacca v Italy (App no. 50774/99) ECHR 2005-I, paras 28-29 
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the only factor.  It is submitted that Lord Kerr’s approach reflects the recent trend in Strasbourg 
jurisprudence.    
There is another line of jurisprudence which partially overlaps with that on photography; it 
concerns the distinctive position of the State as regards the records it holds on citizens. 
Consistent case law suggests that the storing of information relating to an individual's private 
life triggers Article 8.75 In PG and JH, the ECtHR held that private life considerations may 
arise once a systemic or permanent record comes into existence; that person’s expectation as 
to privacy may be relevant but not conclusive.76  In Rotaru, the information concerned the 
applicant’s public protest and political affiliations – activities that are not particularly private. 
In finding an intrusion, the nature of the information so recorded and the question of whether 
the information has been accessed are irrelevant.77  In focussing on the creation of files, the 
ECtHR reflects the concerns that underpinned the development of data protection rules.78  
While the Court of Justice has had little opportunity to rule on media intrusion, it has 
emphasised the importance of data protection, both in its own right and in connection with the 
right to privacy.  Significantly, focusing on data storage and the State use of databases as a 
specific intrusion takes the courts away from considering only the ‘reasonable expectation of 
privacy’, a problematic - if not circular – and potentially subjective test.79 
Although the vast majority of the cases concerning State storage of data have taken the view 
that storage of data is sufficient no matter the nature of the data, an outlier case should be noted: 
S and Marper.80  While it re-affirmed the previous jurisprudence, the ECtHR also seemed to 
limit the concern about storage to ‘data relating to the private life of an individual’. In so doing, 
it suggested that relevant factors would not be limited to the content of the data, but – referring 
to the cases broadly about photography in public by authorities- also the specific context in 
which the information at issue has been recorded and retained, the nature of the records, the 
way in which these records are used and processed and the results that may be obtained.81  
The approach of the Supreme Court to this issue is uneven.  In Catt, 82  the police took 
photographs of Mr Catt at demonstrations.  Although he was not convicted of any public order 
offences, the police kept the photographs, along with further information on Mr Catt and his 
relationships with other protestors. His challenge to the legality of this went through the 
domestic court system to the Supreme Court, and is now pending at Strasbourg.83  In Catt, one 
point on which their Lordships were unanimous was that Article 8 applied. Lord Sumpton 
                                                          
75 Rotaru v. Romania (App. no. 28341/95), judgment 4 May 2000 (Grand Chamber), [2000] ECHR 192, paras 43 
and 48; Leander v. Sweden (Series A/116), judgment of 26 March 1987, para 48; contrast Joint Select 
Committee on Human Rights, Legislative Scrutiny: the Investigatory Powers Bill, 1 June 2016, para 2.3. 
76 PG and JH, n. 62, para 57 
77 Kopp v. Switzerland (App. no. 23224/94), judgment 25 March 1998, (1999) 27 EHRR 91, para 93; Rotaru, n. 
75, para 46; to similar effect in the EU, see Joined Cases C‑465/00, C‑138/01 and C‑139/01 Österreichischer 
Rundfunk and Others, [2003] ECR I-4989, para 75;  Joined Cases C‑293/12 and C‑594/12 Digital Rights Ireland 
and Others v. Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources, Minister for Justice, Equality and 
Law Reform, judgment 8 April 2014 (Grand Chamber), EU:C:2014:238, para 33; and Schrems n. 1 para 87 
78 Amann v. Switzerland (App no. 27798/95) (Grand Chamber), judgment 16 February 2000, para 65 
79 C.f. Weller n. 58; Lord Kerr’s remarks in JR38, n. 72; N A Moreham ‘Privacy in the common law: a doctrinal 
and theoretical analysis’ (2005) 121 LQR 628, pp. 647-8; E Barendt, ‘Problems with the “reasonable 
expectation of privacy” test’ (2016) 8 JML 129 
80 S and Marper (App no 30562/04), judgment 4 December 2008 (Grand Chamber) [2008] ECHR 1581 
81 S and Marper, n. 80, para 67 
82 R (on the application of Catt) v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis and R (on the application of T) v 
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2015] UKSC 9. 
83 Catt v. UK (App. no. 43514/15), communicated 19 May 2016. 
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stated, ‘there may be some matters about which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy 
notwithstanding that they occur in public and are patent to all the world. In this context mere 
observation cannot, save perhaps in extreme circumstances, engage Article 8, but the systemic 
retention of information may do’.84   The question of whether the information obtained would 
be stored or form part of a record was not discussed in Kinloch or in JR38, suggesting that the 
Courts there may have thought that storage or further dissemination were also conditional on a 
reasonable expectation of privacy rather than separate routes to trigger privacy. 
It is submitted that the systematic storage of ANPR reads, as well as their subsequent analysis 
in a variety of ways, constitute intrusions into privacy which must be justified.  Insofar as S 
and Marper can be seen as imposing further requirements, either the photographing of the car 
and its occupants or the impact on ‘locational privacy’ (discussed below) satisfies any such 
sensitivity threshold. The argument based on photography is, however, comparatively weak.  
The main focus is the number plate. The photographing of the driving of a car – without more 
-is unlikely to be an intimate action, even given the sensitivity of a person’s image and the 
ECtHR’s views in Reklos, unless the inside of a car is seen as private space.  The argument on 
locational privacy is not only stronger, it raises wider questions about the impact of other 
interconnected surveillance and tracking devices in public spaces. 
Locational privacy refers to the ability of individuals to move in public spaces in normal 
circumstances without their locations being systematically monitored and/or recorded.   
Surveillance based on location data can occur in a number of ways. It starts with capture of an 
individual’s location at a particular point in time but can include real time monitoring of a 
succession of locations providing direction of movement; predictive tracking, which infers a 
person’s near future behaviour by extrapolating from a person’s direction of travel; and 
retrospective tracking, which uses the individual’s data trail to reconstruct that person’s 
movements, behaviour and associates, but can be used to suggest purposes and intention.85  
Even without any particularly embarrassing or sensitive incident taking place, the accumulation 
of many points of incidental information can be intrusive affecting our ‘zone of interaction’.86  
So, ‘privacy results not from locked door and closed curtains, but also from the way our 
publicly observable activities are dispersed over space and time’.87   Location data is seen as 
sensitive in data protection terms, particularly in the context of smart phones,88 although other 
devices –e.g. bank cards and registered Oyster cards - could produce location data having a 
comparable impact.  Locational privacy issues may arise in contexts beyond data storage and 
analytics; monitoring location data is akin to virtual tracking or directed surveillance of an 
individual.89 Recognising this category of privacy is important in understanding the extent of 
the intrusion into privacy created by the use of technologies including but not limited to ANPR.  
                                                          
84 Catt n. 82, para 4; see Bullen Leake and Jacob’s Precedents of Pleadings from Sweet and Maxwell, Part V- 
Invasion of Privacy, Section 79 Invasion of Privacy, para 79-07. 
85K. Michael and R. Clarke, ‘Location Tracking of Mobile Devices: Uberveillance Stalks the Streets’ (2013) 
Computer Law and Security Review, 209, p. 219. 
86 Clayton and Tomlinson, n. 58,  paras 12.31-13.33, noting changing emphasis; Weller, n. 58; N A Moreham 
‘Beyond Information: physical privacy in English law’ (2014) Cambridge Law Journal 350, p. 355 
87 Uteck, Anne ‘Ubiquitous Computing and Spatial Privacy’ in Ian Kerr, Valerie Steeves and Carole Lucock (eds) 
Lessons from the Identity Trail (OUP, 2009) citing Reiman, Jeffrey, ‘Driving to the Panopticon: A Philosophical 
Exploration of the Risks to Privacy Posed by the Highway Technology of the Future’ (1995) 11 Santa Clara 
Computer and High Technology Law Journal 27 
88 Article 29 Working Party Opinion; Ittihadieh v 5-11 Cheyne Gardens RTM Company Ltd & Ors [2017] EWCA 
Civ 121 
89 See e.g. Monmonier, M., ‘The Internet, Cartographic Surveillance and Locational Privacy in Maps and the 
Internet (Elsevier, 2003); Michael and Clarke, n. 85, p. 220 
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While locational privacy was never perfectly guaranteed, the development of some 
technologies (for example BWV, UAV, devices with GPS embedded in them, as well as CCTV 
and ANPR) pose a greater threat to locational privacy, especially given the greater computing 
capacity available to store and to analyse any resulting data and the greater ubiquity of such 
devices. Monitoring of location has similarities to monitoring of social media activity 
(SOCMINT) in that both may be seen as relating to public, but nonetheless potentially 
sensitive, activities and the monitoring is consequently intrusive. Omand et al suggest that the 
use of SOCMINT needs careful control for this reason, and suggests that it is similar in impact 
to directed surveillance.90  
The ECtHR considered some aspects of locational privacy in Uzun.91  Uzun was suspected of 
committing terrorist offences so he was tracked via GPS. Uzun argued that the GPS had enabled 
the authorities to draw up a comprehensive picture of his movements in public for months by 
means of a measure which was both precise and difficult to detect.  The ECtHR accepted that 
tracking constituted an intrusion with an Article 8 right, even though the car in which the 
tracker was installed did not belong to Uzun, but a friend of Uzun’s, S. It argued that: 
by the surveillance of the applicant via GPS, the investigation authorities, for some 
three months, systematically collected and stored data determining, in the 
circumstances, the applicant's whereabouts and movements in the public sphere. They 
further recorded the personal data and used it in order to draw up a pattern of the 
applicant's movements, to make further investigations and to collect additional 
evidence at the places the applicant had travelled to, which was later used at the criminal 
trial against the applicant.92 
In its analysis, the ECtHR downplayed the impact of such surveillance. It distinguished 
surveillance by GPS from other methods of visual or acoustical surveillance which, according 
to the Court, ‘are, as a rule, more susceptible of interfering with a person's right to respect for 
private life, because they disclose more information on a person's conduct, opinions or 
feelings’.93  Even so, Article 8 was clearly engaged though on the facts the interference was 
justified. 
Given that the ECtHR accepted that the determining of the whereabouts in public falls within 
Article 8, the same argument could be made with regard to ANPR; given the approach to 
‘passenger name record data’ (PNR), which includes travel habits, a similar approach is likely 
to be taken by the Court of Justice.94  Of course, ANPR is designed to record cars not people, 
so not all movements might be recorded – not even all car movements may be recorded. 
Nonetheless, Uzun accepted the link between person and car and implicitly that a perfect record 
of personal movements would not be required to trigger Article 8. It also seemed to accept that 
the fact that a car may not have the same occupants in each instance would not undermine this 
link between car and person.  Of course, one might argue that surveillance by ANPR is less 
intrusive than GPS because of these factors95 and – by contrast to, for example, UAV and 
                                                          
90 Omand, Bartlett and Miller ‘Introducing Social Media Intelligence’ (2012) 27 Intelligence and National 
Security 801, p. 822; see also O’Floinn and Omerod n. 18 on the transformative nature of systemic surveillance 
in social media, p 777. 
91 Uzun v. Germany (App no. 35623/05) Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2010-VI 31 December 2010 
92 Uzun, n. 91, para 51 
93 Uzun, n. 91, para 52 
94 A-1/15 Canada PNR Opinion, Opinion 8 September 2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:656 
95 See Joined Cases C-317 and 318/04 European Parliament v Council and Commission [2005] ECR I-2467, 
Opinion of the Advocate General; view of Advocate General in Opinion A-1/15 n. 94. 
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BWV, limited to public spaces.  This argument goes to the intensity of the intrusion, not 
whether Article 8 is engaged in the first place. 
Insofar as it is arguable that ANPR gives only a partial picture, the argument becomes less 
convincing as increasing numbers of ANPR cameras are installed, making it hard to avoid 
being recorded and also facilitating a more detailed picture of individuals’ movements.  While 
the car does not equate to a person, through DVLA and insurance records likely drivers can be 
identified; the faces of those in the front seats may also be visible, perhaps bringing in some of 
the concerns about photography generally.  Potentially, this increase in cameras affects our 
autonomy, as we lose the ability to be free from surveillance, and our choices are limited by 
the invisible choices of the state.  Furthermore, ANPR can be used not just to help identify who 
drove down a particular road, but also for vehicular matching, network analysis and (possibly 
in conjunction with other data) in-depth individual profiling, which are more intrusive forms 
of location surveillance.  As with other bulk collection of data, the innocent are ‘transformed 
into potential suspects’96.  Further, depending on the location of ANPR, some places or areas97 
could be under effectively constant surveillance: a place of worship; a sports stadium.  Tracing 
the vehicles then gives you a means to identify individuals and their connections.  This is 
particularly problematic, however, when specific groups are singled out, raising the risk of 
discrimination in terms of groups consequently the subject of surveillance. 
The ECtHR has recognised that the accumulation of data and its analysis, even where the data 
points in isolation seem quite harmless, can be revealing. In Zakharov and in the EU 
communications data retention cases both European courts highlighted the impact of 
communications data, rather than content, being retained and analysed.98  The Court of Justice 
noted that such data allows the profiling of the individuals and so is no less sensitive than the 
actual content of communications. 99   It concluded that the interference, which led to an 
individual feeling under constant surveillance, was ‘very far-reaching and must be considered 
to be particularly serious’.100  A similar argument could be made in the context of ANPR, 
especially where there is an increased density of cameras, the fact that searches may take place 
across a national dataset and consequently wide geographic scope, and given the potentially 
broad range of analytic techniques that may be used across NADC.  In sum, the courts have 
recognised that a high degree of monitoring, even in public of insignificant actions can 
cumulatively be problematic, 101  even a harassment. 102    It may be that in future such 
                                                          
96 Case A-1/15 Canada PNR Agreement, n. 94, Opinion, para 176 
97 Under Project Champion two suburbs in Birmingham were to be monitored by a network of 169 ANPR, 
including covert cameras, were to form "rings of steel", so that residents could not drive into or out of the 
areas without being tracked. Project Champion was funded from the police Terrorism and Allied Matters Fund. 
After this was revealed, the project was abandoned. See Surveillance Camera Commissioner, Speech to the 
automatic number plate recognition (ANPR) national user group, in York, 26 November 2015, available: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/surveillance-camera-commissioners-speech-to-the-anpr-national-
user-group-2015, accessed 17 February 2017.  A further ring of steel around Royston was subject of a 
complaint to the ICO, resulting in an enforcement notice 
98 Joined Cases C‑293/12 and C‑594/12 Digital Rights Ireland, n. 77, para 27 
99 Tele2/Watson, n. 1, para 99 
100 Tele2/Watson, n. 1, para 100 
101 R. M. Pomerance, ‘Shedding Light on the Nature of Heat: Defining Privacy in the Wake of R v. Tessling 
(2005) 23 CR (6th) 229, p.234-5 made this point in the Canadian context 
102 Von Hannover n. 62; The English courts have also recognised the impact of ongoing surveillance, admittedly 
obiter and not in this context: Bernstein v. Skyways [1978] 1 QB 479; contrast a one –off instance where the 
photography by the police and its context was clear: Catt n. 82, para 34 but note comments of Lord Collins of 
Mapesbury as to the potentially chilling effect of such police behaviour, para 97. 
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monitoring103 - because of this particular pervasive and on-going characteristic - itself engages 
Article 8 ECHR and Article 7 of the Charter. 
Justification 
Both the Charter and the ECHR permit the justification of an intrusion into privacy/data 
protection rights provided certain requirements are met.  As far as the ECHR is concerned, 
Article 8(2) specifies three stages. The interference must be based in law, for a legitimate aim 
and ‘necessary in a democratic society’.  For the Charter, Article 52(1) constitutes an analogous 
provision.  While its requirements may be similar, its terminology is different. 104   Any 
limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by the Charter must be 
provided for by law and must respect the essence of those rights and freedoms. Further, 
limitations may be imposed on the exercise of those rights and freedoms only if they are 
necessary and if they genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the European 
Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.105 Finally, any restriction should 
apply only insofar as is strictly necessary.106 The exception should not turn into the rule.  While 
these tests are well-established in the courts’ respective jurisprudence, the framework is not 
always clearly applied in a structured manner. Nonetheless, the cases to date are sufficiently 
clear to raise questions about the acceptability about the current ANPR framework as regards 
acquisition of data (the categories of person whose data is acquired), access to the data and data 
retention. 
‘based in law’ 
Article 8(2) ECHR requires that an interference be ‘in accordance with the law’, which is 
different from the text used in relation to other Convention rights where an interference must 
be ‘prescribed by law’.  While this difference could suggest that mere compliance with general 
norms (such as DPA, PoFA) might suffice, in practice the difference in wording between 
Article 8(2) and Article 10(2) has been described as ‘irrelevant’.107    Even if the ECtHR is 
flexible as to the form the law must take, 108 the qualitative requirements (discussed below) 
mean that the requirement here is more than ‘not illegal’.  Furthermore, this textual difference 
is not found in the text of Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter.  Article 52(1) of the Charter specifies 
that exceptions ‘must be provided for by law …’. It is an open question whether the form of 
                                                          
103 In Vukota-Bojic v. Switzerland (App no. 61838/10), judgment 18 October 2016, which concerned the 
monitoring of the individual’s activities in public, as well as the taking of photographs of those activities, the 
Court stated ‘the applicant was systematically and intentionally watched and filmed by professionals’ para 58 
which indicates that there were two aspects in issue: the watching (no record) and the filming (record) – but 
both in a systematic context.  Again, a ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ was not the sole criterion. 
104 It is sometimes suggested that there are four elements: legitimacy; suitability; necessity; proportionality 
strictu sensu. See e,g  L. Feiler, ‘The Legality of the Data Retention Directive in Light of the Fundamental Rights 
to Privacy and Data Protection’ (2010) 1(3) European Journal of Law and Technology [Internet Publication] 
section 7.3 
105 Tele 2/Watson, n.1, para 94; Digital Rights Ireland n. 77, paras 46-7; more generally see e.g. Feiler, n. 104  
106 Tele 2/Watson n. 1, para 96 and cases cited 
107 S. Sottiaux Terrorism and the Limitation of Rights (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008) p. 298 
108 Malone v UK (App no. 8691/79) [1984] ECHR 10, para 66, reiterated in Zakharov, n. 1, para 228 
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law required should be legislative in form,109 rather than common law based as English courts 
have emphasised110 had been accepted previously - at least by the ECtHR.111 
The ECtHR has set down qualitative requirements in respect of any such law: accessible; 
sufficiently clear as to be circumstances under which interference may be justified; and 
consistent with the rule of law.  Situations where the law is confused are problematic.112 It 
specified in Zakharov: 
The “quality of law” in this sense implies that the domestic law must not only be 
accessible and foreseeable in its application, it must also ensure that secret surveillance 
measures are applied only when “necessary in a democratic society”, in particular by 
providing for adequate and effective safeguards and guarantees against abuse.113  
In numerous surveillance cases, the ECtHR has focussed on this element, rather than 
considering the proportionality of the measure, perhaps because of the sensitivity of the area.114 
Further, as can be seen in the quotation from Zakharov,115 there are links, perhaps overlap, 
between the requirement of lawfulness and ‘necessary in a democratic society’.116  Somewhat 
unusually, the ECtHR has introduced substantive procedural elements into the test for 
foreseeability/accessibility. While some have criticised this approach for blurring the 
boundaries between Article 8 and  the right to a remedy,117 this remains a consistent part of the 
ECtHR’s approach in this area. Such procedural elements constrain State action and also allow 
individuals to understand at a general level when they might bring themselves within the scope 
of such measures (and to act accordingly118).   
There must be clear, detailed rules specifying the conditions subject to which interferences are 
legitimate.119 The minimum safeguards as regards interception of phone calls120 are: the nature 
of the offences which may give rise to the intrusion; a definition of the categories of people 
liable to be affected; a limit on the duration of telephone tapping; the procedure to be followed 
for examining, using and storing the data obtained; the precautions to be taken when 
communicating the data to other parties; and the circumstances in which recordings may or 
must be erased or the tapes destroyed. While rules can be set down in secondary legislation and 
                                                          
109 Weber & Saravia v. Germany (App no. 54934/00), judgment 29 June 2006, (2008) 46 EHRR SE5, [2006] ECHR 
1173, para 90; Khan v. UK (App no. 35394/97) ECHR 2000‑V; Emmerson, n.2, para 7-28; c.f Murray v UK (1995) 
19 EHRR 193 
110 Wood n. 51 
111 Huvig v France (1990) 12 EHRR 528; Kruslin v France (1990) 12 EHRR 547; Murray n. 109; c.f. Hewitt and 
Harman v. UK (Comm. Dec) (1992) 14 EHRR 657; for criticism of this position see P. de Hert, ‘Balancing security 
and liberty within the European human rights framework. A critical reading of the Court’s case law in the light 
of surveillance and criminal law enforcement strategies after 9/11’ (2005) 1 Utrecht Law Journal 68, p. 78 
112 Khan v. UK n. 109, para 27; Vukota-Bojic n. 103, paras 71-73 
113 Zakharov, n.1, para 236, and see para 230 on safeguards against abuse 
114 M. H. Murphy ‘A Shift in the Approach of the European Court of Human Rights in Surveillance Cases: a 
rejuvenation of necessity?’ (2014) 5 EHRLR 507, pp.510-11 
115 Zakharov, n.1; also Kennedy v. UK (2001) 52 EHRR 4, para 155 
116 E.g Kvasnica v Slovakia (App no. 72094/01), judgment 9 June 2009, para 84 
117 I. Cameron, National Security and the European Convention on Human Rights (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 2000) p. 34 
118 Sunday Times v UK (Application no. 6538/74), judgment 26 April 1979, [1979] ECHR 1 
119 Weber and Saravia, n. 109 
120 Weber and Saravia n. 109, para 95; Zakharov n. 1, para 231 
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codes, 121  any such documents must be publicly available 122  and legally binding. 123   In 
principle, the same points about lawfulness will arise in relation to the Charter. Here, however, 
while the Opinion of the Advocate General in Watson/Tele2 suggested that any such laws or 
codes must be binding on the relevant authorities,124 the judgment did not pick up this issue.  
As noted125, however, the Charter must provide at least the protection of the ECHR, which 
supports the position of the Advocate General.126 
This requirement of lawfulness gives rise to problems for the ANPR regime. The assertion in 
the Home Office Document that ‘[t]he DPA and RIPA provide the framework to support 
Article 8 ECHR’127 is at best questionable.  The DPA, as we have noted, safeguards how data 
is processed but does not provide a legal base; it does not authorise or require the acquisition 
of data through this type of activity.  It does not fulfil all the functions the ECtHR has ascribed 
to ‘law’, specifically it gives no indication of when and to whom intrusive measures might 
apply. So while it might provide some safeguards against abuse, on its own it is not enough. A 
similar point could be made about PoFA. Further, there are no sanctions for non-compliance 
with the PoFA code. Any common law basis for police action is very broad and vague, probably 
beyond acceptable limits for allowing individuals to predict its application.  
RIPA remains as a possible legal base but there are two difficulties with seeking to ground 
ANPR in it. The first is that ANPR does not fit clearly into the categories of surveillance128 
that are regulated by RIPA Part II.  Part II covers covert surveillance - that is, surveillance 
carried out in a manner to ensure that persons who are subject to the surveillance are unaware 
that it is taking place.129  While some specific operations with ANPR cameras located in 
unmarked cars might satisfy this test, it is much less likely that static cameras do so.  Even if 
the police are unwilling to publicise locations, the cameras are potentially visible to the road 
user, even if – as street furniture – they are part of the background and thus practically invisible.  
The PoFA Code describes ANPR, moreover, as overt surveillance.  It has been questioned 
whether the definition of covert surveillance works in the context of mass surveillance, where 
individuals may be aware that the techniques exist – and so do not satisfy a strict view of RIPA 
– but are unaware that the techniques are being used in their respective instances.130  In any 
event, to fall within RIPA, covert surveillance must be one of the following: directed 
surveillance; intrusive surveillance; or the use of CHIS, the last of which is clearly not relevant 
here.  ANPR does not fit these categories.  Directed surveillance is for the purposes of a specific 
investigation, rather than general monitoring; intrusive surveillance relates to activities taking 
place on residential premises131 or in any private vehicle. It would be an expansive view of this 
latter element that might cover ANPR, especially as the use of trackers has been expressly 
excluded.  The second aspect is that surveillance can be carried out even in the absence of 
                                                          
121 Kennedy n. 115 
122 Liberty v. UK (App no. 58243/00), judgment 1 July2008, (2009) 48 EHRR 1; Zakharov, n. 1, para 241,  
123 In S and Marper, n. 80, the Court noted that the rules were non-statutory guidelines, but discussed 
proportionality rather than deciding the case on legality  
124 Tele 2/Watson n. 1, opinion para 150 
125 See n. 46 
126 See S. Peers and S. Prechal ‘Article 52’ in Peers et al (eds) The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A 
Commentary (Hart Publishing: Oxford, 2014), para 52.42 
127 Home Office, The Use of ANPR by Law Enforcement Agencies: Lawful Interference with the European 
Convention on Human Rights, December 2014, para 1.4 
128 Surveillance is defined at s. 48(2) RIPA 
129 Section 26(9)(a) RIPA 
130 Mackay n. 2 
131 Note the Article 8 ECHR covers business premises 
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authorization under Part II.132  The regime has been criticised in this regard,133 being described 
as ‘no more than a voluntary code’.134  This is a weakness indeed when we consider the 
requirement of lawfulness, especially as regards the binding nature of the law.  As noted above, 
the IPA only partially covers use of ANPR data; it would not constitute relevant ‘law’ in this 
context. 
It has been suggested135 that the Criminal Procedures and Investigations Act 1996 (CPIA) 
justifies the retention of data. This argument is weak.  The CPIA was introduced to allow the 
review of evidence after trial so as to avoid miscarriages of justice. It does not deal with 
creation, storage or access and cannot relate to individuals not of interest to the police.  
Furthermore, this obligation to retain evidence has not been found to be sufficient justification 
for retention of data in other contexts (communications data, biometric data)136 and concerns 
have been expressed about using CPIA justifying keeping biometric data on a ‘just in case 
basis’.137 The Anti-Social behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 clarified that, once CPIA 
no longer applies, the sample must be destroyed, and it must not be used other than for the 
purposes of proceedings for the offence in connection with which it was taken.138  It therefore 
undermines the possibility of relying on CPIA as a general justification for retention of data. 
There may also be problems about clarity of the regime. Insofar as it is possible to rely on the 
statutory framework, it consists of overlapping systems with different enforcement 
mechanisms. This is potentially confusing. In all, any framework is undermined by the lack of 
coherence of piecemeal legislative responses, arguably with different rationales.139  Further, 
the fact that there is no authorisation regime setting down conditions of access and use makes 
it difficult for individuals to foresee the applicability of the regime, even if the bulk collection 
of ANPR data is acceptable at a level of principle.  There are insufficient specific safeguards – 
as suggested by Weber & Saravia and subsequent cases- to prevent arbitrary behaviour.140  The 
ANPR system would seem to fail on these rule-of-law criteria. 
‘legitimate aim’ 
This aspect raises few problems.  The European courts seem unwilling to challenge States’ 
claims,141 sometimes inferring the legitimate purposes on behalf of governments.142  Here, the 
data is used for the fight against crime. The investigation of crime is a legitimate public interest 
                                                          
132 Walker, n. 16, para 2.64 
133 Akdeniz, Taylor and Walker ‘Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000’ [2001] Crim LR 73 
134 McKay, n. 2, para 1.37 
135 Freedom of Information Act Request: ‘Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) governance 
arrangements, board papers’, available at: 
https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/289438/response/730763/attach/html/15/18%2019%20Email%2
0ICO%20to%20ANPR%2023042015%201714.pdf.html, accessed 8th February 2017 
136 Hansard, 10 October 2011, Column 104 
137 Commissioner for the Retention and Use of Biometric Material, Annual Report 2014, November 2014, 
available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/387573/BiometricsAnnualR
eport201314Print.pdf, accessed 8th February 2017, pp 59 et seq 
138 Explanatory Notes to Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, para 62 
139 Parsons et al ‘ANPR: Code and Rhetorics of Compliance’ (2012) 3 European Journal of Law and Technology 
(online publication) 
140 Contrast codes on interception of communications in Kennedy n. 121 and R.E v UK (App no. 62498/11), 
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in both EU143 and ECHR systems, although the multiplicity of possible uses for the ANPR data 
may give rise to concerns about ‘purpose creep’, where data obtained for one purpose is used 
for another.  The nature of the public interest is also a relevant factor for assessing 
proportionality, and the distinction between crime and serious crime may be significant in that 
context. Further, the scope of activities that could fall within the prohibited behaviour must be 
sufficiently clear to satisfy the foreseeability requirement.144  While the definition of offences 
is in principle a matter for States, it is also possible that the Court of Justice might start filling 
in the meaning of ‘serious crime’: a reference on the meaning of ‘serious crime’ has been made, 
albeit in a different context.145   
‘necessary in a democratic society’  
‘Necessary in a democratic society’ for the ECtHR means that the interference meets a 
“pressing social need” but also that it is proportionate to the aim pursued.146  It is not found in 
the Charter or its jurisprudence.  While not meaning ‘indispensable’, necessity expects more 
than ‘useful’, ‘reasonable’ or ‘desirable’. 147   Further, the reasons adduced to justify the 
measures must be ‘relevant and sufficient.148  The level of review takes into account all the 
circumstances, and the intensity of review may vary.  The ECtHR has been deferential to State 
concerns about national security, but measures such as powers of surveillance are more closely 
scrutinised.149  Given the importance of data protection for the effective exercise of privacy 
rights, the margin of appreciation is limited in this context too.150  Another aspect is whether 
the measure is appropriate for achieving the aim, a question which goes beyond just a logical 
connection.  There must be some degree of success or effectiveness,151 although it is debateable 
the extent to which any such effectiveness has been required to be clearly evidenced.152  A 
proportionality assessment may also return to some of the issues relevant for the lawfulness 
assessment.  While some commentators have been critical of the ECtHR’s approach, 153 
especially its earlier jurisprudence, more recent case law in this area shows a greater 
willingness on the part of the ECtHR to engage with a proportionality assessment.154 
The Court of Justice will consider whether the essence of the right has been destroyed and 
whether an instance of interference is proportionate.  While the essence test may show another 
formal distinction between the tests applied by the two courts,155 it is a high barrier to cross 
and the Court of Justice has not often found this test satisfied even in some cases involving 
mass surveillance.156  An infringement was found in Schrems, however, in relation to the 
content of communications.157  In terms of proportionality, there are similarities to the approach 
                                                          
143 Digital Rights Ireland Ltd n. 77, para 41 
144 E.g Zakharov, n. 1, para 247 
145 Case C-207/16 Ministerio Fiscal, pending 
146 Handyside v UK (App no 5493/72), judgment 7 December 1976, (1976) 1 EHRR 737, [1976] ECHR 5, paras 
48-49 
147 Handyside, n. 146, para 48 
148 Peck n. 51, para 76 
149 Klass v Germany (App. no. 5029/71), judgment 6 September 1978, para 42 
150 Surikov n. 142 
151 In S and Marper, n. 80, the Court referred to the need for the justifications to be relevant and sufficient 
152 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy, Joseph A. Cannataci (A/HRC/31/64), 8 March 2016, 
para 11 
153 P. de Hert, n. 111, p. 80 
154 See e.g Zakharov n. 1; Surikov n. 142; Murphy ‘A shift in approach’, n. 114, pp. 414 et seq 
155 A third difference might be the ‘margin of appreciation’: see Peers, n. 126, paras 52.68- 52.69 
156 See e.g.  Digital Rights Ireland n. 77 paras 39-40 
157 Schrems, n.1 
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taken by the ECtHR.  Any room for national discretion was in this context limited.  In reaching 
this conclusion, the Court of Justice emphasised the importance of data protection to ensuring 
respect for private life,158 impliedly reflecting early concerns about the power of the state being 
enhanced by databases.  Since Digital Rights Ireland, the Court of Justice has been willing to 
engage in extensive analysis of the proportionality of State measures in the context of national 
security and the fight against terrorism considering critically both the idea of ‘necessity’ and 
the level of safeguards provided by the system; the issue of appropriateness has received less 
attention.  
In the context of ANPR, the case law of both European courts on mass surveillance159 are 
relevant.  ANPR collects and retains the data of all vehicles, which can be linked back to 
individuals, whether or not those vehicles are wanted in connection with a particular offence. 
The system is therefore indiscriminate, rather than suspicion-based. Such a system requires 
particularly strong justification (especially with the retention of data for increasingly long 
periods) given both European courts have been critical of systems of mass surveillance in the 
context of communications.160  As noted, it may be that GPS and passenger name records in 
relation to international flights are less intrusive than communications surveillance, but this 
does not mean that such intrusions have no weight161 especially where a detailed individual 
picture may be generated.162 While data retention and data mining may be appropriate, perhaps 
identifying persons of interest hitherto unknown, problems arise when considering 
necessity/proportionality.  Of particular concern is the fact that the data collected and retained 
is ‘general and indiscriminate’, so that in the view of the Court of Justice, even a relatively 
serious objective (the fight against serious crime and terrorism) could not be justified.  While 
some note that it may be possible always to find some examples of cases that have needed 
retained data to solve them,163 the Court of Justice has side-stepped this type of argument.  In 
an indiscriminate system, there is no link between the data retention and the threat posed by a 
specific individual and, in its view, therefore goes beyond what is ‘strictly necessary’.164  While 
bulk powers may be acceptable where they distinguish quite finely between categories of 
people (or perhaps activities), blanket bulk powers are not.165  Even where bulk powers might 
be acceptable, stringent safeguards to prevent abuse would be of central importance in 
determining whether such powers were proportionate.    
The position appears less emphatic in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR.  In the chamber decision 
in Szabó,166 the ECtHR appeared to accept that mass acquisition of data may be necessary for 
the fight against terrorism, but on the facts in issue there were inadequate safeguards.  A 
concurring opinion, however, expressed a strong view that the Grand Chamber in Zakharov 
imposed a requirement for a more specific level of suspicion even in the context of serious 
                                                          
158 Digital Rights Ireland n. 77, para 48; also Tele2/Watson n. 1, para 83 
159 ‘Mass surveillance’ is not a term derived from law and its precise boundaries have been the subject of much 
discussion: see European Commission for Democracy through Law  (Venice Commission) (2015), p 12; 
Fundamental Rights Agency, Surveillance by intelligence Services: fundamental rights safeguards and remedies 
in the EU, 2015, p. 17 
160 Digital Rights Ireland n. 77, Tele 2/Watson, n. 1; Zakharov, n. 1 
161 Vukota-Bojic, n. 103, para 76. 
162 Parsons, n. 139 
163 Feiler, n. 104, at 7.3.3 
164 DRI n. 77, para  56; Tele 2/Watson n. 1, paras 96, 105 
165 Tele2/Watson, n. 1 
166 Szabó, n. 1 
 19 
 
crime.167  Previous cases, for example S and Marper168, took a similarly strong line against 
blanket and indiscriminate State acts.  If indiscriminate acquisition of data remains in principle 
possible, the safeguards are of central importance to proving that the resulting intrusion is 
necessary in a democratic society. 
The general retention of ANPR data may be disproportionate in the light of both courts’ 
jurisprudence.  ANPR affects all road users in England indiscriminately. Further, the objectives 
for which ANPR data is used cover a wide range and, crucially, include low-level offences 
(e.g. untaxed or uninsured cars) suggesting that even if location data is less intrusive than 
communications data, the justification for intrusion is less strong.  There is little evidence that 
the acquisition or retention of this data is ‘strictly necessary’, rather than ‘useful’, insofar as it 
is effective at all.169  There is no discrimination in the system between retention of data relating 
to those of interest to the police, nor of distinguishing between offences of different levels of 
seriousness.   
It is open to question whether the decision to install ANPR cameras and the choice of 
location/intensity are activities requiring justification. Such choices are clearly caught in the 
context of locational privacy; less obviously so in relation to an analysis based on systemic 
storage of data. It may, however, be difficult or artificial to distinguish between 
acquisition/monitoring and storage where the acquisition method is the creation of a 
photographic record.170  Certainly, the PoFA Code suggests that any ‘decision to use any 
surveillance camera technology must, therefore, be consistent with a legitimate aim and a 
pressing need’ and designed to meet the stated purpose and deployed only for the necessary 
time; essentially a proportionality analysis.171 The phraseology – especially the word ‘use’ – 
blurs the issue of acquisition and storage whilst making it clear that ‘use’ needs to be justified. 
While PoFA may suggest useful constraints on ANPR use, it cannot be seen as an adequate 
safeguard in human rights terms because it is not binding.  Additionally, PoFA also does not 
directly consider location.  The Information Commissioner’s Code on CCTV, which is binding, 
suggests that data controllers consider whether the location for CCTV cameras is appropriate 
for purpose and does not intrude on private property. It does not directly address the locational 
privacy concerns arising from accumulation of data and an intensity of cameras. The 
Information Commission has taken action against the use of ANPR, notably against the 
Royston ‘ring of steel’.172 While demonstrating that ex post enforcement mechanisms exist,173 
the Data Protection Act in terms of ex ante safeguards requires internal review only.  The 
installation of ANPR cameras can in this context be contrasted with the collection of 
communications data.  There, although the collection of data is potentially widespread, it must 
be triggered by a notice to the telecommunications operator.  ANPR is distinctive in having no 
link to governmental or external oversight at this stage.  It is questionable whether this is 
sufficient. 
                                                          
167 Szabó n. 1, para 20 
168 S and Marper, n. 80 
169 Big Brother Watch noted that the levels of crime in Royston did not increase after the dismantling of the 
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The Tele2/Watson case considered the adequacy of safeguards around access to data and 
examination of the data. In this there are similarities with the ECtHR’s approach. Indeed, that 
court recently noted “a certain level of consensus” about the level of safeguards, based on 
acceptance of data protection principles.174 Again objective criteria must be established which 
limit access, and following Tele2/Watson, access to a person’s data should be granted ‘only to 
the data of individuals suspected of planning, committing or having committed a serious crime 
or of being implicated in one way or another in such a crime’175, with further access to people 
indirectly connected to such activities being allowed in exceptional circumstances (such as 
terrorist activities).   
It is questionable whether the handling arrangements currently in place for access to and 
analysis of the ANPR data are adequate despite the data protection and PoFA codes. The 
Information Commissioner’s code states that use of ANPR must be justified. Further, databases 
must be kept up-to-date and accurate (in particular to prevent mismatches).  Data must be kept 
secure and retention periods must be the minimum necessary for the purpose for which the data 
was collected and immediately thereafter be deleted.  These requirements provide some 
safeguards but, by comparison with the requirements from the surveillance jurisprudence, lack 
specificity and allow too much room for manoeuvre on the part of the processor. Moreover, 
retention periods determined by reference to a purpose are problematic in terms of bulk 
acquisition and retention of data. The access arrangements for communications data under the 
Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 (DRIPA) were challenged in Tele2/Watson.  
The Court of Justice required independent supervision of access; indeed, it suggested that such 
independence would be found through prior authorisation by a judge or other independent 
body, where a request for access is made on the basis of a ‘reasoned request’ 176 .  Such 
independent supervision is a safeguard against fishing expeditions, in that such a system could 
ensure that there was some form of justification for investigating a particular car/owner prior 
to that investigation taking place.  Note that Tele2/Watson concerns a system that requires sign-
off by a senior officer but involves the “Single Point of Contact”, an officer separate from an 
active investigation, trained in surveillance and matters pertaining to human rights. The ANPR 
system has no equivalent level of protections, so is more vulnerable to challenge on this issue. 
Finally, data must be deleted in a timely manner, in accordance with any internal rules or data 
handling codes.  This seems not always to have been the case, at last as regards the Met.  Case 
law makes clear that there are limits on how long any data can be retained. The nature of the 
offences sought to be prosecuted and the nature of the data affect the permissible retention 
period, as does the nature of the data held.  Both the Data Retention Directive – which permitted 
two years’ retention – and DRIPA which specified one year – were seen as problematic in 
terms of period of retention.   The concern arises partly from the undifferentiated nature of the 
retention; it is one thing to retain data on suspicion or in relation to a prosecution, it is another 
thing entirely in relation to a person of no interest to the police.  This is the trap into which 
ANPR falls.  Even if a two year period in relation to terrorism or other serious offences is 
acceptable, which is dubious in the light of recent case law, the not very serious nature of some 
of the offences for which ANPR is used may weigh against such long retention.  An extension 
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would make any justification still harder; indeed the ICO has raised this point, questioning 
whether the operational case for such an extension has convincingly been made.177  
Conclusion 
This paper has argued that the ANPR system constitutes an intrusion into the private lives of 
road users based on both the ECHR and EU Charter. By contrast, English case law has not 
consistently recognised the concerns around privacy in a public space. ANPR has not been 
considered directly.   Data retention triggers the application of the right to private life whether 
seen in Charter or Convention terms and must therefore be justified in accordance with the 
ECHR and the Charter.  Beyond this is the question of locational privacy, the importance of 
which has not yet been directly addressed by any of the courts.  It has been argued that if we 
look to the concerns that the courts have highlighted, then locational privacy should be 
protected.  Even focussing just on systemic retention of ANPR data, the system needs to be 
justified.  Here the ANPR regime runs into multiple problems: the inadequate basis in law; the 
bulk nature of the data retained; the lack of safeguards against abuse; and the disproportionate 
extent of the retention period. In short, the regime is fundamentally defective.  It would seem 
far better to set up a legislative regime, with appropriate safeguards and oversight mechanism, 
rather than to allow the current system to continue – though bulk acquisition of ANPR data 
may remain problematic in the light of jurisprudence on blanket data gathering.  Not only is 
the current position undesirable from the perspective of the road-user but the police use of 
ANPR data is exposed to legal challenge with potentially far-reaching consequences.  Given 
that it is not just ANPR which may give rise to these issues, a broader review should be 
undertaken. All police surveillance in public space should be considered – such as that relating 
to the use of drones and BWV – to produce a coherent and appropriately calibrated system 
rather than one which is once again reactive, piecemeal and possibly still incomplete. 
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